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LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE. By Louise L Shelley. New Bruns-
wick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 175. $25. 
Soviet iuriskonsults, the general counsel employed by state-run 
economic enterprises, are charged with protecting the legal interests of 
their enterprises. But they are hindered by an economic system that, 
because of its corruption and inefficiency, does not respond well to 
legal incentives. 
Professor Shelley1 has interviewed twenty-five emigre iuriskonsults 
and economic-court judges (arbitrators), almost all Soviet Jews who 
left in the 1970's and settled in the United States, Canada and Israel 
(pp. 6, 15). Notwithstanding the obvious risk of bias in this non-
random sample (p. 13), the interviews provide an interesting factory-
level view of Soviet enterprises and the role of the iuriskonsult. Too 
often, however, Shelley's view of the iuriskonsult's actual activities co-
alesces with her vision of what he may be capable of doing. The result 
is sometimes confusing. 
Legislation enacted in 1972 charges the iuriskonsult with five gen-
eral responsibilities: (1) to ascertain that drafts of enterprise regula-
tions conform to the law; (2) to defend the legal rights of the enterprise 
and its employees, in court if necessary; (3) to monitor the fulfillment 
of contracts and sue for damages in the event of breach; ( 4) to help 
improve the efficiency of the enterprise and the quality of its produc-
tion; and (5) to educate the workers by providing consultation and 
delivering lectures (p. 34). 2 Officially he is "an active member of his 
organization rather than a bureaucrat on the sidelines" (p. 34), "able 
to use the law to combat economic inefficiency" (p. 35). 
In practice, the iuriskonsult falls far short of the legislative ideal. 
The iuriskonsult strives to help his enterprise fulfill its plan by negoti-
ating and monitoring supply contracts between enterprises, but the ba-
sic terms are imposed by central planning directives and may be 
impossible to carry out (p. 58).3 He can do little to avert the problems 
that arise from shortages, poor production standards and embezzle-
ment (p. 58). He may sue enterprises that supply his own with sub-
standard products, but cannot thereby deter future breaches because 
managers are rewarded more for fulfilling their production quotas 
than organizations are penalized for producing inferior goods (p. 61 ). 
1. Associate Professor of Sociology at the American University School of Justice. She lived 
in the Soviet Union for a year and a half, and conducted the interviews in Russian. Pp. 6, 8. 
This book appears to be an expansion of a journal article, Shelley, Law in the Soviet Workplace: 
The Lawyer'.s Perspective, 16 LAW & SOCY. R.Ev. 429 (1981-82). 
2. For a detailed summary of the 1972 law, see Giddings, The Jurisconsult in the USSR, 1 
REV. OF SOCIALIST L. 171, 184-97 (1975). 
3. See E. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 218-19 (1969). 
1033 
1034 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1033 
Such suits, moreover, often exacerbate the existing inefficiency. Pro-
fessor Shelley tells of a bread factory that was required to return its 
empty flour sacks to the food distribution center. The two enterprises 
were linked by a conveyor belt, but the belt traveled in only one direc-
tion. The factory had no truck, and the ministry refused to provide 
one. Unable to return the sacks, the factory was sued each year and 
compelled to pay huge fines to the food distribution center. Each 
year's fines would have sufficed to buy two or three trucks (p. 75). 
Although one of the iuriskonsult 's major functions is to review 
management actions and veto or report illegal actions (pp. 33, 34), an 
enterprise director will sometimes induce or pressure the iuriskonsult 
(he may fire him at whim (pp. 46, 108)) to use his legal skills to help 
the director break the law in the most inconspicuous manner (pp. 110-
11 ). Thus, the iuriskonsult may lend his expertise to covering up in-
dustrial accidents (p. 110), or helping a corrupt director evade prose-
cution (p. 84). 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Shelley argues throughout the 
book that the iuriskonsult can play an important part in the Soviet 
economy by vigilantly filing suit to recover fines for the enterprise (pp. 
57-58, 62-64), by tracing the causes of inefficiency in the enterprise and 
proposing correctives (p. 4), and by improving labor relations (pp. 4, 
144). In presenting anecdotal evidence in support of this proposition, 
however, she often fails to indicate whether she is describing what she 
considers to be the typical activities of iuriskonsults or an ideal role 
that the typical iuriskonsult may or may not someday fulfill. It is only 
through an occasional passing comment that the reader gathers that 
much of the discussion is normative. For example, she concedes at 
one point that "[o]nly a few [iuriskonsults] have become 'problem solv-
ers'; most remain 'paper pushers,' content merely to review and com-
plete the documentation required by their organizations" (p. 57). 
The book itself provides ample anecdotal evidence of the reason 
iuriskonsults are unable to "transcend their usual roles" (p. 143). A 
textile factory must knowingly produce substandard cloth because it 
receives an inadequate supply of raw material (p. 62); an arbitrator 
simply has no choice but to affirm supply contracts that are known to 
be technically unfeasible (p. 61); lower-wage employees must accept 
side payments because it is impossible for them to live on their salaries 
(p. 84). Soviet theory as to the role of the iuriskonsult, Shelley con-
cludes, "is based on the fallacious premise that the primary causes of 
interorganizational disagreements are legal rather than economic" (p. 
58).4 Furthermore, ambitious Soviet law students typically aspire far 
4. And if the systemic inefficiency is intractable, the corruption is worse. Shelley offers no 
hope at all for reducing it: 
Until the members of the Soviet bureaucratic and Party elite identify their welfare with 
that of their enterprises, law will remain an ineffective weapon against the second [le., ille-
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beyond the position of iuriskonsult. 5 The pay is low, 6 there is little 
prestige (pp. 52, 142) and little prospect for a coveted Party post or 
other significant promotion (pp. 45-46). And Soviet legal education 
does not prepare lawyers well for iuriskonsult work (p. 57). 
Still intent on demonstrating the iuriskonsult 's importance, Shelley 
exalts his role in counseling and protecting individual workers who 
seek his aid. He may advise an illegally dismissed worker how to 
regain her position and receive back pay (p. 106), and he counsels 
workers on personal problems such as divorce or physical abuse by 
husbands (p. 115). luriskonsults, the author concludes, are "personal-
izers of the law" (p. 144) who "provide the flexibility needed for the 
survival of the Soviet legal system" (p. 145).7 Here again, her argu-
ment appears to be normative rather than descriptive. She observes 
that "[n]ot all lawyers personalize the Soviet legal system; most, pre-
sumably, remain bureaucrats concerned solely with legal formalities" 
(p. 144). 
Ultimately, Shelley's attempt to give substantial significance to the 
iuriskonsult 's work is not convincing. There is little that even the 
most conscientious and strongest-willed iuriskonsult could accomplish 
in the world she so clearly paints, a world in which debilitating ineffi-
ciency and virulent corruption nurture each other.8 
This is, nonetheless, a valuable book. It provides an authentic 
glimpse of a little-known branch of the Soviet legal profession whose 
activities, modest as they are, touch every aspect of Soviet organiza-
tional life.9 The first Soviet book on iuriskonsults appeared only in 
gal] economy, and iuriskonsults and arbitrators will be permitted only to remedy the damage 
inflicted by the second economy instead of fighting to eradicate it. 
P. 9S. 
S. They are more likely to become advokots (who argue criminal defense and both sides of 
private civil litigation), procurators (who investigate and prosecute serious crimes) or judges 
(who, as in most civil law countries, rise through the ranks of a judicial civil service). See gener-
ally Barry & Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-32 (1968). 
6. The pay is slightly less than the average wage of Soviet workers, pp. 28, 42, though a few 
very successful iuriskonsults earn up to three times the average wage. P. 4S. Furthermore, apart 
from an occasional bribe from an embezzling employee, pp. 80-82, or favor from a corrupt direc-
tor, p. 84, there are relatively few opportunities for illegal enrichment. Pp. 80, 85. The chief 
iuriskonsult for one trade organization was able to buy scarce goods at cost from the stores under 
the organization's jurisdiction. The stores, however, gave similar goods free to the inspectors, the 
heads of numerous departments and members of various police and prosecuting agencies. The 
iuriskonsult explained that "'[w]ith all these people on the take, not much depended on the 
iuriskonsult.'" P. 82. 
7. Of course, one hopes that conscientious lawyers and judges everywhere attempt to per-
form the same function, bending and modifying the inert written law to accommodate 
circumstances. 
8. For a capsule overview of this troubled economy, see President Chernenko's Moving Tar-
get, EcONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1984, at 71 (based on recently published data in CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, HANDBOOK OF EcONOMIC STATISTICS (1984)). 
9. See p. 142. 
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1960,10 though they antedate the revolution. 11 English-language 
works tend to either devote only a few pages to the iuriskonsult12 or 
merely analyze the legislation.13 One recent work is apparently by a 
former iuriskonsult, 14 but Shelley's perspective, through her sample, is 
far wider. As she recognizes (p. 13), her sample is not random. Al-
most all the interviewees were members of an unpopular minority who 
were so dissatisfied with life in the Soviet Union that they chose the 
difficult route of emigration. 15 Further, their views on their work are 
not tested by the opinions of enterprise directors, employees or eco-
nomic planners. A more representative sample, however, is not likely 
to be available soon. 
10. L. SHOR, ORGANIZATSIIA IURIDICHESKOI SLUZHBY NA PREDPRIIATII I V 
SOVNARKHOZE (2d ed. 1964), cited in Barry & Berman, supra note 5, at 17 n.50. 
11. Luryi, Jurisconsults in the Soviet Economy, in 3 SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN 169 (1979), 
12. See, e.g., S. KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: 
THEIR HISTORY AND OPERATION 572-74 (1970). 
13. Giddings, supra note 2. 
14. Luryi, supra note 11. See Giddings, supra note 2, at 184. 
15. She appears to exacerbate some of these biases. For example, in screening potential inter-
viewees, she rejected those who "appeared to be motivated by the prospect of financial remunera-
tion" (the interview fee). P. 12. Having thereby eliminated the venal from her sample, she is able 
to conclude from the interviews that iuriskonsults "appear to be less involved in illegal economic 
activity [than other legal professionals] ...• [Flew iuriskonsults appear to take advantage of the 
available opportunities." P. 80. 
